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Abstract
This paper examines how tribes, the dominant political structure in rural areas of
many developing countries, aﬀect the allocation of development resources. I create a
dataset of Yemeni tribes and demonstrate that areas with more tribes per capita
i.e more inter-tribal heterogeneity -receive larger allocations of development resources.
My empirical analysis, which focuses on development resources in the education
sector, demonstrates that this eﬀect reﬂects the enhanced ability of smaller tribes to
both provide public goods and extract patronage from the central government. The
intuition for this result is developed in a model that links inter-tribal heterogeneity and
access to development resources; as tribes are endogenous political structures that
formed to solve public good problems during an agrarian period, smaller tribes are less
internally heterogeneous and more eﬀective in engaging in political action.
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Introduction

The relationship between social heterogeneity and local access to development resources has
been studied extensively in recent years. Following the early work of Alesina, Baqir, and
Easterly (1999) [henceforth ABE], most of these studies have found a negative relationship
between heterogeneity and local resource provision.1 However, several empirical studies
have found a positive relationship between heterogeneity and the distribution of government
resources. These latter studies have typically implicated ethnic or caste patronage as the
key reason for these findings.2
This paper, which is the first economic study to my knowledge that examines the
impact of tribes on the allocation of development resources, has two central contributions.
First, I extend the heterogeneity and public good model developed by ABE to demonstrate
that areas with more tribes per capita will have higher per capita levels of local resources.
Second, I create a unique dataset of tribal structure in over 1,000 administrative units in rural
northern Yemen to test this model; I demonstrate that areas with more tribes per capita i.e. areas with greater ‘tribal heterogeneity’ - do indeed have higher levels of resources.
The ABE model predicts a negative relationship between inter-group heterogeneity and
the level of public good provision (i.e. municipalities with more ethnic groups provide less
public goods). My theoretical contribution extends this model to demonstrate that intergroup heterogeneity has a positive impact on the per capita level of resources if individuals
select both the type and level of the public good within their group. This revised structure
is consistent with the de facto decentralized structure of rural Yemen, as well as many other
rural areas in developing country contexts.
My model relies on an assumption motivated by the endogenous structure of tribes.
Tribes formed during an agrarian period in order to provide public goods (e.g. agricultural
risk diversification, defense, maintenance of markets) that were important for the success of
agrarian rural societies (Dresch 1989, Weir 2007). The key implication of this endogenous
structure is that the individuals’ preferences for public goods (e.g. location of a school or
well) will be more heterogeneous across tribes than within.
1

While many of these studies use relatively stylized political models to understand the observed negative
correlation between ethnic heterogeneity and public good provision in developed countries (e.g. Alesina and
Ferrara 2005), more recent studies have examined the mircoeconomic mechanisms driving a similar negative
relationship found in several developing countries (e.g. Miguel and Gugerty 2005; Habyarimana, Humphreys,
Posner, and Weinstein 2007).
2
Both Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) and Bros (2010) provide evidence that the caste structure may
strengthen the ability of some Indian communities to extract resources from the state. However, both Alesina,
Baqir, and Easterly (1999) and Alesina and Ferrara (2005) suggest that a positive correlation could be found
between diversity and public good provision in the presence of ethnic patronage, and Alesina, Baqir, and
Easterly (2000) provide evidence of its existence in U.S. cities.
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My empirical analysis tests the relationship between inter-tribal heterogeneity and per
capita development resource provision. While the model studies public good provision at
the level of the tribe, I show how the predicted impact of tribe size - the specific form of
heterogeneity implied by the model - can be tested using more aggregated data. This allows
me to use data from rural subdistricts, the most disaggregated administrative structure in
Yemen, to study the impact of average tribe size on log per-capita resources.
Tribal heterogeneity is calculated using local tribal identities. While these local tribes
are embedded in a complex hierarchical structure - with every family maintaing local, regional, and national tribal identities - local tribes are typically believed to play the most
important role in local politics and public good provision. Indeed, these local polities seem
to have developed to provide public goods that were essential to the survival of communities
during an agrarian period (Weir 2007). My subdistrict-level tribal dataset, which contains
data on over 4,000 unique local tribal identities, allows me to calculate the number of tribes
per capita for over 1,000 subdistricts.3
Development resources in this analysis focus on the education sector. Several school
censuses and a nationwide educational facility survey provide a tool for measuring the local
availability of educational resources. The school censuses provide an estimate of the number
of school teachers for each subdistrict and the educational facility survey reports the number
of school classrooms for each subdistrict.
The main empirical specifications includes geographic variables and regional fixedeffects to control for, respectively, the cost of providing educational resources and the potential impact of regional bureaucrats (e.g. influence of local Ministry of Education officials).4
A variety of agricultural, population, and access to services controls allow me to examine the
robustness of these results to factors that likely affected both the development of the tribes
as well as the ability of the subdistrict to engage in political action independent of the tribe.
I first test the relationship between tribe size and educational resources as measured
by the number of teachers and the number of classrooms in a given subdistrict. I find a
negative and significant relationship between tribe size and both the number of teachers and
classrooms which is consistent with the predictions of my theoretical model. The estimated
relationship between tribe size and the number of teachers is robust to the inclusion of a rich
set of controls - i.e. controls for population density, total population, number of villages,
government services, agricultural conditions, and ruggedness of the terrain. However, the
relationship between tribe size and school infrastructure is more tenuous; the significant
3

The average subdistrict in my data contains 13 villages, 6,500 residents and 5 different tribes.
Specifically, district fixed-effects are included as district-level offices are the most disaggregated Ministry
of Education structures. Note that these offices are typically staffed by individuals from outside the area as
an effort to prevent corruption.
4
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relationship between tribal size and the number of classrooms disappears when additional
controls are included.
A second empirical section, which studies the difference between the effect on educational infrastructure and educational employment, concludes that tribes are engaged in
both patronage extraction and public good provision. The strong and robust impact of tribe
size on the number of school teachers reflects tribes’ role in the educational patronage system as suggested by previous authors (e.g. Posusney and Angrist 2005; DRI 2008, Phillips
2008). Indeed, it provides evidence that tribes are able to affect the allocation of the nearly
40% of school teachers that are “ghost teachers” - i.e. teachers that do not teach (ARD
2006). However, I also demonstrate tribes do have a significant and robust effect on school
infrastructure built by Western donors. As Western-built infrastructure is less likely to be
patronage construction, as Western donors insist on significant monitoring and oversight,
this provides compelling evidence that tribes also provide modern public goods.
Throughout the analysis, identification rests on the assumption that the number of
tribes is exogenous to the development of the education system. This is motivated directly
by the theoretical model; as tribes formed during a historical period to provide a public
good essential to that earlier period, the size of tribes today is not affected by modern
public goods. There is significant empirical evidence to support this result. Phillips (2008)
has argued that tribal structure has been stable since at least the time that the borders of
subdistricts were demarcated in the 1930s-1960s, and potentially much longer. Similarly,
both Dresch (1989) and Weir (2007) suggest that the tribes have maintained a very similar
structure for hundreds of years through an Ottoman occupation, the rule of several Imams
and the arrival of the Yemeni Republic. Given the recent arrival of widespread education
in Yemen - the first rural schools did not appear until the 1960, and very few rural areas
had schools before the mid-1970s - it seems unlikely that the education system has had a
significant impact on tribal structure.
My analysis offers three other insights about the role of social institutions in development. First, most econometric analyses treat ethnic groups, caste structures, religious
groups, etc. as well defined and internally homogenous structures. Here I provide a theoretical motivation, based on well characterized previous results, for why tribes are expected
to be internally heterogeneous and provide empirical evidence consistent with this internal heterogeneity. As the development of Yemeni tribal structures mirrors the development
of ethnic and other social identities in other rural developing country contexts, i.e. they
emerged to provide public goods required of rural agrarian societies, it is likely that my
results are applicable in other developing country contexts.
Second, my analysis suggests that engaging indigenous social structures, such as tribes,
3

may influence the effectiveness of development efforts. In particular, if these indigenous
polities are indeed the primary actor in the distribution of development resources in rural
areas, as compared to more aggregated state constructed polities, engaging these groups
directly may enhance the effectiveness of these efforts.
Third, this analysis shows the important role that a non-Islamic institution can play
in the modern development of a country of the Muslim Middle East.5 Most discussions
of the role of institutions in development in the Middle East have focused on Islam (cf.
Kuran 2004, Chaney 2008). Additionally, while non-Islamic institutions may have a direct
impact on development, as I have shown here, they may also have indirect impacts. As an
example, there is significant evidence that tribal institutions have had an important impact
on the development of legal systems across the Middle East (e.g. Charrad 2001, Weir 2007).
Thus, a more careful examination of non-Islamic institutions is important in understanding
development in the Middle East.
In the following section I extend two existing models of public good provision to provide
intuition for why heterogeneity in the size of tribes should be expected and why smaller tribes
should be more effective public good providers. Section 3 discusses the empirical approach
including a motivation and description of the empirical estimation, the identification strategy,
the measure of heterogeneity employed, and the other data that is used for the analysis.
Section 4 examines the relationship between average tribe size and per capita educational
resources. Section 5 then examines whether these tribes are engaged in public good provision
or patronage extraction. Section 6 concludes.

2

Model

The model is developed in three subsections. The first describes the setup of the model. The
second adapts the approach of Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) in describing the public
good provision of tribes. The third section uses the endogenous structure of the tribes to
demonstrate the positive expected relationship between tribal heterogeneity and the level of
public good provision.
5

Tribes are particularly interesting as they are a pre-Islamic institution in Yemen and many other Middle
Eastern countries (Khoury and Kostiner 1990). Indeed, in the apocryphal tale describing the arrival of Islam
to Yemen, the Islamic cleric that eventually started Islam in Yemen came originally at the behest of two
powerful tribes in order to settle a dispute.
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2.1

Setup

Consider a fixed geographical region of population P . I will refer to this geographical region
as a subdistrict, as this will be the geographical unit that is the focus of the empirical work.
The population P is composed of individuals with ideal points for public goods distributed
uniformly on the segment [0, P ].6 Individuals’ utility is decreasing with the distance of
their tribe from their ideal point. These ideal points should be interpreted as ideological,
geographic, taste-based, or income-based preferences for the types of public goods that tribes
can provide.7 Each individual has ideal point for public goods important during an agrarian
period (e.g. wells, conflict mediation) and a modern public good (e.g. school teachers,
lobbying).
Public goods are provided by an individual’s tribe and each individual’s utility is given
by
Ui = g α (1 − Di ) + y − τi ,

0<α<1

(1)

where g is his per-capita share of the public good provided by the tribe, Di is the preference
distance from individual i to the public good, y is private income, τi is the tax paid by
the individual to the tribe, and α is a parameter that reflects individuals’ distance-adjusted
utility from consuming the public good (assumed to be constant across individuals). y − τi
is private consumption.

2.2

Equilibrium Public Good Provision within a Tribe

Take a single tribe, n, among the N tribes in this subdistrict. The members of this tribe
have to decide, by majority rule, on a modern public good, both on its size and type. After
the public good is selected, a lump-sum tax is levied on all tribes members in order to fund
the good. The lump-sum tax is assumed to be identical for everyone.
Using the implied budget constraint – i.e. g = t – individual utility becomes
Ui = g α (1 − Di ) + y − g.

(2)

Solving for the equilibrium type and level of public good provision requires the following
6

This assumption makes the model tractable in closed form. I discuss the implications of relaxing this
uniformity assumption at the end of this section.
7
Individuals may actually differ on multiple dimensions simultaneously, but here I map all types of
heterogeneity into a single-dimension to makes the predictions of the model clear. Relaxing this singledimensionality will not change the key comparative statics of Proposition ?? (see Section II.B of Alesina,
Baqir, and Hoxby (2004)).
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assumption about the voting process:
Assumption 1. Individuals vote first on the amount of taxation, and then on the type of
the public good.
This assumption is made for tractability, in order to avoid issues of multidimensional voting.
However, this assumption approximates political behavior within the tribes as tribal members
are first taxed and then the leadership decide on how resources would be spent.
I use the median voter theorem to determine both the type and level of the public good
provided. Though all members of a tribe are not typically consulted when these decisions
are made, tribal elders are involved in these processes. As each tribal member is represented
by an elder, this application of the median voter theorem provides an approximation for
the median elder. This difference is important as it may affect the type of “public” good
provided (i.e. it may be a public good provided only to the tribal elders involved in the
political process).
I now solve the model backward, starting with the following result, which derives from
a straightforward application of the median voter theorem.
Proposition 1. For any positive amount of public good g, the type chosen is the one most
preferred by the median member of the tribe.
Let me now consider the choice of the size of the public good g. Individual i’s preferred
size is given by the solution to the following problem:
ci ) + y − g
max Ui = g α (1 − D
g

(3)

ci is the distance of the individual i from the ideal type of median voter. This
where D
formulation incorporates the fact that the voters know that, after a decision is reached on
the size of g, the type chosen is the one most preferred by the median voter. The solution
of (3) is
gi∗

h
i1/(1−α)
c
= α(1 − Di )

(4)

m as the median distance from the type most preferred by the median voter
d
Define D
- in short the “median distance from the median”. A straightforward application of the
median voter theorem leads to Proposition 2:

Proposition 2. The amount of public good provided in equilibrium is given by
gi∗

h
i1/(1−α)
m
d
= α(1 − D )
6

(5)

2.3

Tribe Size and Public Good Provision

My key result derives from the endogenous structure of tribes. Tribes formed during an
agrarian period in order to provide public goods that were important for the success of
agrarian rural societies (Dresch 1989, Weir 2007). In particular, tribes organized a variety of
goods with economies of scale (e.g. agricultural risk diversification, defense, and maintenance
of markets) for members of the tribe.
The key implication of this endogenous structure is that there will be more inter-tribal
(across) than intra-tribal (within) heterogeneity with respect to the distribution of ideal
points for the agrarian public good. Thus, increasing the number of tribes in a subdistrict
will decrease the internal heterogeneity of each tribe, increase the per capita public good
provision of each tribe, and consequently increase the per capita public good provision of
the entire subdistrict.8
The following assumption, which makes my result tractable in closed form, is motivated
by this endogenous structure. Note that this is a limiting case as it is analogous to assuming
that (1) tribal structure achieves the social welfare maximum with respect to providing
an agrarian public good with economies of scale, as characterized by Alesina and Spolaore
(1997), and (2) individuals’ ideal points are perfectly correlated across the agrarian and
modern public good.9
Assumption 2. All tribes in a subdistrict are of equal size and each tribe represents a
contiguous segment of the distribution of ideal types for the public good.
Given Assumption 2 and the assumption that the population, P , is uniformly dism , becomes
d
tributed on [0, P ], the median distance from the median, D
1 P
m =
d
·
D
4 N

(6)

so that Equation 5 becomes
gi∗

 
1/(1−α)
1 P
= α 1− ·
4 N

8

(7)

This analysis takes the number of tribes formed during this agrarian period as given. Footnote 9 provides
some intuition for why the number of tribes is likely to vary across subdistricts.
9
The equivalence of Assumption 2 to these two assumptions requires one further assumption - i.e. that
there is a strong positive correlation between geographical location and preferences for a public good. Under
these three assumptions, Proposition 1 of Alesina and Spolaore (1997) follows directly and each tribe in a
subdistrict will be (1) equally sized and (2) cover a continuous range of ideal points for that subdistrict.
This equivalence provides intuition for why we would expect variation in the size of tribes across districts.
In particular, Proposition 1 of Alesina and Spolaore (1997) implies that tribe size should be inversely related
to the cost of providing public goods in a subdistrict .
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Equation 7 demonstrates that public good provision should be increasing with the number
of different tribes in a given subdistrict. A proof of this result is presented in Appendix A.
Three assumptions drive the closed form result presented in Equation 7. The first
assumption, Assumption 2, is equivalent to assuming that tribes were formed in order to
minimize heterogeneity within the tribes. However, the qualitative interpretation of Equation 7 is maintained for any assumption that results in less intra-tribal than inter-tribal
heterogeneity. As an example, the same negative relationship is obtained if (1) individuals migrated across tribes in response to their access to the agrarian public good, which is
suggested by the gradual migration rate of individuals between tribes,10 and (2) ideal types
for the agrarian and modern public goods are positively correlated. The migratory process would equalize the maximal distance from the median across tribes so that the median
distance from the median would decrease as the number of tribes increased.
The second assumption, that the distribution of ideal types is uniform, is not restrictive;
the qualitative result will not change for more general distributions. As long as tribes are
of equal size (i.e. Assumption 2 is maintained) the range covered by each tribe, as well as
the median distance from the median, will decrease monotonically with the number of tribes
regardless of the distribution of types.
The third assumption is that α is constant across individuals, and thus across subdistricts. If α, which measures individuals’ distance-adjusted utility from consuming the public
good, is allowed to vary across subdistricts, then it is not possible to identify the independent
impact of tribe size on public good provision. While α may differ across regions for certain
classes of public goods (e.g. girls’ education), I believe that this is a reasonable assumption for the problem studied here (i.e. the value of boys’ education is widely appreciated
throughout rural Yemen).

3

Empirical Approach

In this section I elaborate my empirical approach in three subsections. The first uses results
from my theoretical discussion to motivate my basic estimating equation, the second explains
my identification strategy, and the third describes the data used in the empirical analysis.
10

The migration of individuals between adjacent tribes is a common, if infrequent, occurrence in rural
Yemen. Approximately 1% of the households of any given tribe will migrate to another tribe every decade
(author’s calculations using a qualitative village survey instrument).
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3.1

Estimating the Impact of Diversity on Patronage

My empirical strategy is based on Equation 7 though my unit of analysis is the subdistrict
and not the individual. Since all tribes in a subdistrict are of equal size, per-capita public
good will be equalized across tribes. Consequently, per-capita public good provision will be
identical for every individual i in a given subdistrict and it follows that
 
1/(1−α)
1 Ps
gs = α 1 − ·
4 Ns

(8)

where s indexes subdistricts, g is per-capita public good provision, P is total population,
N is the number of tribes, and α is a parameter that reflects individuals’ distance-adjusted
utility from consuming the public good (assumed to be constant across subdistricts).11 I can
take logs of both sides and re-write this equation as


log(α)
1
1 Ps
log(Gs ) − log(Ps ) =
+
log 1 −
.
1−α
1−α
4 Ns


1
log(α)
1 Ps
−
≈
1−α
1 − α 4 Ns

(9)
(10)

where GS is total public good provision in subdistrict s.12 The second (approximate) equality
follows from the empirical definition of Ps used here. In particular,
 Ps iscalculated as the
Ps
is close to one.
total quantity of men in a subdistrict divided by 10,000 so that 1 − 41 N
s
Equation 10 motivates my basic estimating equation

log(Gs ) = β0 + β1

Ps
Ns


+ β2 log(Ps ) + s

(11)

where the subscripts s denotes subdistricts and s is an error disturbance which is assumed
to be i.i.d. As the total quantity of public good provision should be decreasing in the average
Ps
tribe size, N
, my theoretical predicts that the sign on β1 should be negative.
s

3.2

Identification Strategy

Identification here rests on the central assumption that the observed number of tribes within
an administrative subdistrict is exogenous to the modern public goods that are the focus of
this analysis. This assumption requires that these public goods have not affected the number
of tribal units within a subdistrict.
11
12

See Section 2 for a further discussion of the α parameter.
Note that log(gs ) ≡ log(Gs ) − log(Ps ).
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This assumption is motivated directly by the theoretical model; as tribes formed during
a historical period to provide a public good essential to that earlier period, the size of tribes
today is not affected by modern public goods. This assumption is supported by the very
slow rate of adaptation of the tribes. Dresch (1986, 1989) uses historical texts to show that
many tribes have maintained the same borders for over a millennium. Weir (2007), who uses
legal documents maintained by the tribe themselves in her analysis, similarly concludes that
the tribes of her study, which do not overlap with those of Dresch, were stable for over four
hundred years.13
The public goods that are the focus of this analysis are a very recent phenomenon.
Access to education, health, and modern roads was extremely limited throughout the country
until the 1960s and most rural areas did not have access to these facilities until the 1970s
at the earliest (Appendix B provides more details on the emergence of the education system
that is the focus of this analysis). Thus, given the historical stability of the tribes, and
the slow rate of evolution, it is unlikely that these modern public goods have affected the
structure of the tribes.

3.3

Data

In this subsection I describe the tribal and educational data that are at the core of this analysis. A description of the administrative structure and the variety of population, area, terrain,
economic and agricultural controls used throughout the analysis is deferred to Appendix C
though Table 2 provides key summary statistics for these variables.
3.3.1

Tribal Data

For this analysis I collected data on the tribal structure in 1,073 rural Yemeni administrative
subdistricts from eight Yemeni governorates.14 For each governorate studied, I identified a
Yemeni research assistant from that governorate to assist me in collecting the data. These
research assistants then collated information on the tribal structure in each subdistrict of
their respective governorates through a combination of field visits to district capitals and
conversations with friends and family members.
The variable that is the focus of this analysis is the number of local tribes per subdis13

Though tribes do evolve over time, qualitative research done in conjunction with this project suggests
that only one percent of tribal families will switch tribes in any given decade (author’s estimates using
qualitative village survey data).
14
There are a total of 19 rural governorates with a total of 2,031 rural administrative subdistricts. These
eight governorates are not fully representative of Yemen as they are all drawn from the tribal regions of
northern Yemen. However, they still provide a useful sample for testing the plausible impact of tribes, as is
the focus of this analysis.
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trict. Local tribes is defined here as the most disaggregated tribal identity identifiable by
my research assistants.15
Figure 1 illustrates the significant local variation in tribal structure within one administrative district. As most of my empirical specifications include district-level fixed effects,
in order to control for unobserved local factors that might affect tribal size and access to
educational public goods, my results are identified off of this within-district variation. Figure
2 then demonstrate the variation of tribal diversity across one governorate (this is the same
governorate from which Figure 1 was drawn). Finally, Figure 3 describes the full coverage
of my data; areas colored in blue are places for which there is no tribal data available.
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the average size of tribes at the subdistrict level,
which is the tribal measure motivated by the theoretical analysis.
3.3.2

Education Data

The education variables that are the primary outcome of interest in this analysis are drawn
from two key sources: (1) three national school surveys conducted during the 1999-2000,
2000-2001 and 2005-2006 school years and (2) an educational facility census from 2007.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variety of educational variables that are used as
dependent variables throughout this analysis.
Two key types of variables are used for the analysis. The first type of variable is the
number of male school teachers per subdistrict. This analysis excludes female teachers as
they tend not to function as substitutes for male teachers - as female teachers typically will
not teach male students in rural areas - and the politics of female education are not the focus
of this analysis. Data for this variable is available for all rural schools in each of the three
school surveys. These surveys contain data for 11,916 (1999-2000), 12,748 (2000-2001), and
14,367 (2005-2006) rural schools.
The second type of data is the number of classrooms per subdistrict. This data is drawn
from the 2007 educational facility census which provides detailed data on school infrastructure. While this facility census provides more detailed information on school infrastructure,
the available data is somewhat incomplete and only contains data on 11,375 schools.
These data allow me to identify the agent who funded the construction of each classroom. I aggregate these agents into seven different groups: (1) Arab donors - Egyptian,
Emirati, Iraqi, Kuwaiti, and Saudi donors, (2) Western donors - American, Asian, and European donors, (3) local donors - Yemeni individuals, private corporations, and religious
15

In practice, this was predominantly tribes identified of the “fourth branch” - i.e. four times removed from
national-level tribal confederations - though in some cases they were identified as “fifth branch”. Though I
also have data on all the higher order affiliations of each of these local tribes, I use the disaggregated tribal
identities in calculating my measures of tribal diversity following the advice of several Yemeni colleagues.
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charities, (4) local councils - district parliaments designed to interface between government
ministries and citizens of the district, (5) government ministry - the President’s Office, the
Office of Public Works, and the Ministries of Agriculture, Education, and Electricity, (6)
Social Fund for Development (SFD) - Yemeni parastatal development organization that receives funding from foreign and Yemeni governments, and (7) community - built by the local
community only.
There are two important differences between the first and second measure. First, while
the second measures the total stock of physical educational infrastructure built locally by
communities, central government ministries and development donors, the first measures the
flow of the educational public good to a subdistrict. Second, the number of teachers per
subdistrict is only a public good if those teachers are actually teaching. A discussion of this
latter point is the focus of Section 5 below.

4

Educational Resources and Tribe Size

This section focuses on estimation of Equation 11. However, I will estimate

log(Gd,s ) = β0 + β1

Pd,s
Nd,s



+ β2 log(Pd,s ) + γ 0 Xd,s + ηd + d,s

(12)

where d denotes subdistricts, s denotes subdistricts, log(Gd,s ) is the log of total public good
availability, log(Pd,s ) is the log of the total population, and d,s is an error disturbance which
is assumed to be i.i.d. Equation includes two types of controls not predicted directly by the
theory: (1) district fixed-effects (ηd ) which adjusts for the fact that educational resources
are typically allocated through district-level representatives and (2) a vector of geographic
and population variables (Xs ) that control for the cost of of providing educational resources.
The following subsection examines the relationship between tribal size and the amount
of public goods available. A second subsection examines the robustness of these results to a
broader range of control variables.

4.1

Tribe Size and the Availability of Educational Resources

Table 3 examines the impact of tribe size on the distribution of educational resources.
Columns (1) and (4) report the most basic regression which compares the impact of tribe
size on local access to educational resources across all subdistricts. Columns (2) and (5) include district fixed effects so that the point estimate on tribe size reports the impact within
districts. Columns (3) and (6) look at the impact of tribe size controlling for factors that

12

potentially affect the cost of providing those resources.
The key result of Table 3 is found in columns (3) and (6) which demonstrate the
significant negative relationship between tribe size and both the flow of educational resources
(i.e. the number of teachers) and the stock of educational resources (i.e. the number of
classrooms) at the subdistrict level. These results provide empirical evidence for the key
theoretical result presented in Equation 7. Importantly, the significance of the relationship
differs across the two differ measures; understanding this difference is the focus of Section 5.
There are two other important differences between the impact of tribe size on the flow of
educational resources and the stock of educational resources. The first important difference
is that the impact of tribe size on the stock of educational resources seems is only within
districts while the impact of tribe size on the flow operates both across and within districts.
This difference can be seen by comparing the difference in the estimated relationship of
tribe size across columns (1) and (2) to the difference across columns (4) and (5). This
difference reflects the difference in the nature of the two educational resources. While the
construction and placement of new educational infrastructure necessarily involves district
level bureaucrats, as permission for new construction typically requires obtaining permission
from local councils, the distribution of teachers is more fungible. Indeed, as I find that tribe
size affects the number of teachers with and without fixed effects, this indicates that tribes
are able to petition both district and higher-level bureaucrats to obtain additional positions.
The second difference between the results for these two different variables is that the
estimated relationship for variables that proxy for the cost of providing educational resources
differ. In particular, though the impact of most of these control variables is similar, which
can be seen by comparing columns (3) and (6), the estimated impact of population density
differs substantially across the two variables. The estimated negative impact of population
density on the number of classrooms, even if insignificant, is unsurprising as classroom sizes
are necessarily smaller in low density areas as children are limited in the distance that they
can travel to attend school. However, the estimated positive and significant relationship of
population density on the number of teachers is more unexpected.

4.2

Robustness of Results

The focus of the empirical analysis presented directly above (Section 4.1) was to test the
predictions of the theoretical model. Thus, only a limited number of control variables, i.e.
those factors likely to affect the cost of providing educational resources, were included in the
analysis. In this Section I examine the robustness of these results to the inclusion of a variety
of agriculture and access to services control. The agricultural variables provide proxies for
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agricultural wealth and local political structure (see discussion below) and the access to
service variables provide additional controls for local wealth and government penetration
into the region.
The key result to emerge from Table 4 is that the estimated relationship between tribe
size and educational resource provision is robust to a diversity of agricultural and access
to service controls. However, while the significance of the estimated impact of tribe size
on school teachers is not affected by the inclusion of these variables, the impact on school
infrastructure seems somewhat more fragile.16 This fragility is the focus of the subsequent
section.
Several other important results emerge from this robustness analysis. First, Table
4 provides further evidence of the importance that local political structure can have on
access to development resources. This is demonstrated most strongly in columns (2)-(3),
though also in columns (5)-(6), by the point estimates on the two variables that measure
the structure of land ownership in these rural areas. The positive coefficients indicate that
areas with more small landholders provide more of these development resources.17
The importance of local non-agricultural wealth in the provision of these educational
resources is also demonstrated in Table 4. Indeed, the share of households without sanitation and the share of households using primitive cooking fuels exhibit a robust negative
relationship for both teachers and for school infrastructure. These two variables are the best
proxies for local non-agricultural wealth available in these data.
The results for agricultural wealth are more mixed. The share of cultivable land and
the number of sheep and goats both exhibit a positive relationship with educational resource
provision, suggesting a positive relationship for agricultural wealth. However, the production of both qat and grains show a weakly negative relationship with educational resource
provision. The difference between these results likely reflects the political implications of
each: areas with more cultivable land are more sheep and goats tend to be more equal while
areas with high production of the the two most profitable crops are more unequal.

5

Educational Goods: Public Goods or Patronage?

The results from Section 4 provided mixed results on the relationship between the size of
tribes and educational public goods. While the number of teachers in a subdistrict exhibited
a strong, significant, and robust negative relationship with the size of tribes as predicted by
16

The loss of significance between columns (4) and (5) is partially because of the reduced number of
observations available for the specification in column (5). See Appendix C.3 for more details.
17
The omitted categories are households with more than 20,000 square meters and households with no
land.
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the model, the relationship between the size of tribes and school infrastructure was more
fragile.
This difference suggests that tribal heterogeneity affects both access to real educational
resources, i.e. classrooms and teachers that actively teach, as well as the ability of tribes to
extract patronage from the central government. This result is consistent with the analysis
of ARD (2006) who conclude that “ghost teacher” positions, which account for an estimated
40% of all teacher positions, play a key role in Yemen’s patronage system. Thus, this result is
consistent with previous analyses who have identified the importance of the tribes in Yemen’s
patronage system (e.g. Posusney and Angrist 2005; DRI 2008, Phillips 2008).
However, while all of these previous analyses have argued forcefully for the role of
Yemen’s patronage system, none of them have suggested a role for tribes in the provision
of modern public goods. Thus, these previous analyses raise an important question: are
tribes actually involved in the provision of modern public goods or only in the extraction of
patronage?
Though the results for the number of classrooms in column (6) of Table 3 provide
some evidence that the tribes are indeed engaged in the provision of modern public goods,
it is possible that this result also reflects patronage extraction as tribes secure funding
for classroom construction in order to improve their prestige or benefit (either directly or
indirectly) from the funds that are used to construct the school. Thus, in Table 5 I re-examine
the impact of tribe size on the availability of educational infrastructure by decomposing the
number of classrooms by the type of donor funding its construction. This table reproduces
the specification in column (6) of Table 3 for each of seven different classes of development
donors.
The key result from Table 5, which is presented in column (2), is that the impact
of tribe size on local infrastructure happens almost entirely through classrooms built by
Western donors. Indeed, while the predicted negative relationship is observed for other types
of donors (i.e. local donors, government ministries, SFD), the impact is only significant for
Western funded classrooms. Further, as demonstrated in Table 6, this result is robust to the
inclusion of geographic, population, access to services, and agricultural controls.
As Western donors typically require significant oversight of how their resources are
distributed, it is unlikely that the strong and significant result observed in Table 6 reflects
patronage extraction by tribes. Thus, while the comparably strong impact of tribe size on
the number of teachers suggest that tribe size does affect patronage extraction, this result
provides compelling evidence that tribes also play a role in the provision of public goods.
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6

Conclusion

This paper has made several contributions to our understanding of social structures in the
developing world. The first one is to demonstrate, using a new dataset of unique tribes
covering nearly one-half of rural Yemen, that tribes play an active role in the provision of
development resources in rural Yemen. This has important implications for decentralization
and other types of development reforms in Yemen as it suggests that tribes will play an
important role in these reforms’ success.
Second, my findings demonstrate how increased heterogeneity may enhance the ability
of groups to extract patronage from the state. Though this result is consistent with previous
analysis of patronage in other contexts, I demonstrate how this result is predicted by existing
models of heterogeneity and public provision. As many indigenous social structures, like
tribes, form in areas with significant underlying heterogeneity, it is likely that these results
are generalizable to other similar contexts.
Third, these findings demonstrate that non-Islamic institutions can have an important
impact on development outcomes in a country of the Muslim Middle East. Thus, the focus
on Islam in current discussions of Middle East development draws attention away from other
social institutions that also play an important role in development.
This paper also provides insights into the role that tribes plays in Yemen’s patronage
system. Though a variety of other other observers have commented on the importance of the
tribes in this patronage system (e.g. Posusney and Angrist 2005; DRI 2008; Phillips 2008),
mine is the first to provide clear empirical evidence of how tribal structure affects the ability
of tribes to extract resources from the central government.
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A

Proof of Equation 6

Equation 6 follows directly from Assumption 2 and the uniform distribution assumption.
P
. Without loss of generality,
From Assumption 2 it follows that the size of each tribe is N
consider the tribe on the leftmost
end of the range of ideal types for the public good - i.e.

P
the tribe that covers 0, N
. As the population is uniformly distributed, the median voter
P
P
will locate at the point 12 N
. The median distance from this point is 14 N
.

B

The Recent Expansion of Yemen’s Education System

The education system that exists today in the north of the Republic of Yemen is a very recent
phenomenon. The first public schools did not open their doors until the early 1960s, and
while the educational system did expand rapidly from the late 1970s until the present, the
overall penetration of the education system into rural areas is still quite limited. Importantly,
given its recent arrival and the stability and longevity of the tribes discussed above, it is
unlikely that the education system has affected the structure of the tribe.
18

In northern Yemen in 1962, the year of the revolution which saw the removal of a
religious monarchy, there were only 23 schools serving a population of over 4 million.18 And
while the education system did expand in the wake of the 1962 revolution, the real expansion
of the education system did not happen until the late 1970s.19
The rapid expansion of the education system in the late 1970s, and its continued expansion through the 1980s and 1990s, is illustrated in Figure 4 which shows the construction
of classrooms during the 20th century.20 Today, with over 16,000 schools in the education
system, there is a school for every third village. However, despite the apparent widespread
availability of schools, and the significant resources that are spent on education21 , enrollment
rates are still quite low with 68% of eligible boys and 45% of eligible girls currently enrolled.22

C
C.1

Data Appendix
Yemen’s Administrative Structure

The Republic of Yemen currently has three main levels in its administrative hierarchy.23
The largest administrative structure is the governorate of which there are a total of 21, six
of these are from the former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen and the remaining
15 are from the former Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen). These 21 governorates are
then sub-divided into a total of 333 districts which are further divided into nearly 2,200
subdistricts, the smallest official administrative structure. The nearly 40,000 villages, which
are themselves composed of approximately 200,000 subvillages, do not have any official status
and are typically a locally defined concept.24
18

Under the rule of the Imam, education was done almost entirely in mosques, focused on religious study
and the study of Islamic jurisprudence and was restricted to only the elite.
19
Though Arab and other foreign countries did play an important role in the provision of teachers and the
development of curriculum in the early years of this expansion, as is often discussed, local communities also
played a central role (Alagbari 1992). Indeed, nearly 60% of the school capacity built in Yemen was built by
local communities without the financial support of either the central government or foreign donors (author’s
calculations using the 2007 Education Census).
20
The initial expansion of the education system was driven by the first oil boom as the remittances earned
by Yemeni workers employed in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf surged. Alwashli (2007) provides a more expansive
discussion of the expansion of the education system after the Revolution.
21
Education is the largest component of current government expenditures and accounts for around 20%
of the total budget (though the actual share varies substantially from year to year though it has remained
between 15-25% of the budget in recent years).
22
In addition to lack of access to educational facilities, two central explanations are usually offered for these
low enrollment rates. The first is the high cost of education. Though school is purportedly freely provided,
a variety of fees are typically charged to students which are often prohibitive (see Contin, Egel, Moore, and
Ogleh (2009) for a discussion of this). Note that the Ministry of Education in cooperation with the World
Bank and the European Council are currently experimenting with several conditional cash transfer programs
to help alleviate this difficulty. The second is the particular severity of teacher absenteeism in Yemen with
estimates of absenteeism ranging from 16% (World Bank 2006) to around 50% (Contin, Egel, Moore, and
Ogleh 2009).
23
A variety of other structures, such as subgovernorates, were used in the past but do not find much
practical use today.
24
It is thus impossible to calculate the actual number of villages in Yemen as villages are defined differently
in different data sources. Indeed, while a particular hamlet may be reported in a census as part of another
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For the rural populations that are the focus of this study, the most recent population
census from 2004 reported a total population of just over 14 million individuals residing in
38,736 villages.25 The median district had a population of approximately 35,000, though
there is significant variation in the population of these governorates as the smallest governorate had a population of under 2,000 while the largest had a population of nearly 200,000.
And the median subdistrict had 4,000 inhabitants though again there was relatively significant variation of over 8000 with subdistrict populations ranging from only one hundred
individuals to approximately 80,000.26

C.2

Population and Economic Controls

This analysis uses two types of data from the 1994 and 2004 Population Censuses: (1)
population counts and (2) measures of access to government services. The summary statistics
for these variables are included in Table 2.
The key independent variable in my analysis is average tribe size per subdistrict. Importantly, the numerator for this independent variable is calculated differently for the analysis
of teachers and of school infrastructure. As both the total population and the number of
teachers per subdistrict are flow variables - i.e. they change from year to year - I calculate
the average tribe size variable separately for each year of teacher data. In particular, I use
the 1994 and 2004 Population Censuses to interpolate/extrapolate the population counts
for 1999-2000, 2000-2001, and 2005-2006. The analysis of the infrastructure data uses the
population estimates from the 2004 Population Census directly.
The second type of data are variables that measure access to public services available
for each subdistrict. These variables, which are drawn from the 2004 Population Census only,
include (1) percent of citizens without access to sanitation, (2) percent of citizens without
access to electricity, (3) percentage of households using wood, coal and kerosene for cooking,
and (4) percentage of households without water from a pipe. While these data are available
at the village level, subdistrict average/aggregates were calculated for the analysis considered
here using the total population in a village as weights.

C.3

Agricultural Controls

In order to control for the potential impact of agricultural factors, this analysis include a
variety of agricultural variables drawn from the 2001 Agricultural Census. These variables
include: the total amount of land owned by private individuals, the share of the land that is
cultivable, the type of water access that is available, the size of land holdings, the amount of
animal assets held and the amount of land devoted to grain, qat and cash crop production.
This last variable is of particular importance as qat, which requires significant amounts of
village by a local informant, the informant that is interviewed in another census may indicate that the local
hamlet is actually another village. In general, the census officers and field workers defer to the judgement of
the local informant which is typically a local elder or leader. In many cases this leads to settlements with
only one household and 8-10 members being identified as a separate village in the census.
25
The total population in 2004 was just over 20 million.
26
In the southern govenorates, i.e. those of former South Yemen, subdistricts are much more rare and the
district is often the smallest administrative structure above the village.
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water and grows only in specific climates, is the only true cash crop in Yemen. Though these
data are available at the village level, as the primary unit of analysis here is the subdistrict,
I calculate subdistrict averages for each of the variables using the total population in each
village as the weight for that village. The full list of variables as well as their means and
standard deviations are included in Table 2.
Importantly, the agricultural census does not include all of the governorates for which
I have tribal data. The governorate of Al-Jawf was not included in the agricultural census
as the Ministry of Agriculture and Central Statistical Office judged that the data from this
governorate were systematically biased - it was suspected that residents of these areas were
instructed to lie about their assets and land by their governor.

C.4

Area and Terrain Controls

Three area and terrain controls are included in this analysis: (1) population density, (2) distance from district capital, and (3) terrain ruggedness. Table 2 provides summary statistics
for these variables.
Population density is calculated as the number of individuals per 1,000 square meters.
This measure divides the population estimate for a given subdistrict (from the population
census) by the area of the subdistrict. The area of each subdistrict was extracted from
ArcGIS maps that accompanied the 2004 Population Census.
The distance of a subdistrict from the district capital is calculated using the geographical data available for each data. These data allow me to estimate the population centroid for
each subdistrict - i.e the population-weighted average of the latitude and longitude location
of each village. The distance of a subdistrict to the capital is then calculated as the log
distance of this population centroid to the municipal center.
For my measure of terrain ruggedness I use the vector ruggedness measure (VRM) of
Sappington, Longshore, and Thompson (2007).27 Though other studies in economics have
focused on the terrain ruggedness index (TRI) of Riley, DeGloria, and Elliot (1999) (cf.
Burchfield, Overman, Puga, and Turner 2006; Nunn and Puga 2009), there are two reasons
that I have opted to use the VRM. The first is that the VRM is more appropriate for
the current analysis as it quantifies ruggedness independently of slope. This is important
because even steep terrain is relatively easy to traverse if it is not uneven and broken. Second,
calculation of the VRM is facilitated by the availability of a publicly available toolbox for
ArcGIS that is designed to calculate this measure.28
27

The USGS GTOPO30 file ‘e020n40’, which reports the elevation at approximately one kilometer intervals
for the Arabian peninsula and eastern Africa, was used for these calculations. It was downloaded from
http://eros.usgs.gov/#/Find_Data/Products_and_Data_Available/gtopo30_info.
28
This toolbox is available from http://arcscripts.esri.com/details.asp?dbid=15423. It is important to note that the TRI measure also has a script available to facilitate calculation (http://arcscripts.
esri.com/details.asp?dbid=12435). However, this script is in practice quite difficult to implement with
ArcGIS desktop as it was developed for ArcInfo Workstation.
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Figure 1: Tribal Diversity in One District

Note: This figure shows the number of tribes per subdistrict in one district of the governorate of Dhamar.
The small red dots indicate settlements and the larger dark dot displays the capital of the district.
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Figure 2: Tribal Diversity in One Governorate

Figure 3: Tribal diversity in Eight Governorates of Northern Yemen

Figure 4: School Room Construction in the Northern Governorates

Table 1: Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables

Mean

Standard
Deviation

N=

log(number of male teachers)

3.11

1.18

3572

log(number of classrooms)

3.44

0.94

1000

log(number of classrooms built by Arab Donors)

0.11

0.53

1000

log(number of classrooms built by Western Donors)

0.93

1.18

1000

log(number of classrooms built by Local Donors)

0.10

0.46

1000

log(number of classrooms built by Local Council)

0.89

1.14

1000

log(number of classrooms built by Government Ministry)

2.12

1.35

1000

log(number of classrooms built by Social Fund for Development)

1.33

1.25

1000

log(number of classrooms built by Local Community)

1.92

1.27

1000

Variable

Table 2: Summary Statistics for Explanatory Variables

Mean

Standard
Deviation

N=

Number of people (10,000s) per tribe

0.25

0.27

1031

log(total population)

8.23

0.83

1031

Number of male children (100s)

0.29

0.28

1031

Population density (number of men per 1,000 square meters)

0.59

0.60

1031

Number of villages (100s)

0.11

0.10

1031

Ruggedness (VRM)

0.38

0.12

1031

log(meters from subdistrict population centroid to district capital)

9.21

1.27

1005

Share of Households using Wood, Coal or Kerosense for Cooking

0.41

0.33

1030

Share of Households without Sanitation

0.84

0.19

1030

Share of Households without Piped Water

0.82

0.27

1030

Share of Households without Electricity

0.73

0.34

1030

log(total area owned by villagers in sub-district)

12.4

1.29

981

Share of Land Cultivable

0.87

0.12

981

Share of Cultivable Land that is Rainfed

0.66

0.34

981

Share of Cultivable Land that is Fed from Wells

0.03

0.11

981

Share of households owning plots less than 5,000 square meters

0.57

0.27

981

Share of households owning plots 5,000-20,000 square meters

0.23

0.17

981

Number of goats & sheep per household (100s)

0.07

0.10

981

Number of cows per household (100s)

0.01

0.01

981

Share of land cultivated with grains

0.57

0.30

981

Share of land cultivated with qat

0.13

0.17

981

Share of land cultivated with cash crops

0.03

0.07

981

Variable
Tribal
Variable

Population
Controls

Access to
Service
Controls

Agricultural
Controls

(3)

0.69

0.57
3081

R2

N=

3006

0.69

Yes

Yes

-0.33***
(0.07)
0.98***
(0.04)
0.34***
(0.07)
0.23***
(0.05)
0.16
(0.16)
-0.04
(0.14)
-0.05***
(0.01)

(5)

(6)

998

0.60

No

No

-0.00
(0.08)
0.89***
(0.03)

998

0.69

No

Yes

-0.17*
(0.10)
0.89***
(0.04)

976

0.70

No

Yes

-0.21**
(0.10)
0.77***
(0.06)
-0.13
(0.08)
0.18**
(0.09)
0.36
(0.24)
-0.21
(0.17)
-0.06***
(0.02)

log(number of classrooms)

(4)

Note: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, *** indicates significance at the 1% level.

3081

Yes

Yes

Year Fixed Effects?

Yes

-0.26***
(0.07)
1.12***
(0.02)

No

-0.30***
(0.07)
1.08***
(0.02)

log(number of teachers)

(2)

District Fixed Effects?

log(distance of subdistrict centroid from district capital)

Ruggedness (VRM) of subdistrict

Number of villages in subdistrict (100s)

Number of male school age children (1,000s)

Population density

log(total population)

Number of men (10,000s) per tribe

Dependent Variable:

(1)

Table 3: Tribe Size and the Distribution of Educational Resources

Table 4: Robustness to Agricultural Controls and Access to Service Controls
(1)
Dependent Variable:

(2)

(3)

log(number of teachers)

(4)

(5)

(6)

log(number of classrooms)

-0.33***
(0.07)
0.98***
(0.04)
0.34***
(0.07)
0.23***
(0.05)
0.16
(0.16)
-0.04
(0.14)
-0.05***
(0.01)

-0.34***
(0.07)
0.96***
(0.04)
0.25***
(0.07)
0.29***
(0.05)
0.28
(0.19)
-0.07
(0.13)
-0.02
(0.01)
0.01
(0.02)
0.72***
(0.14)
0.05
(0.06)
-0.05
(0.17)
0.60***
(0.12)
0.77***
(0.14)
0.14
(0.25)
-21.97***
(4.66)
-0.20**
(0.08)
-0.05
(0.12)
-0.05
(0.24)

-0.21***
(0.06)
0.98***
(0.04)
-0.05
(0.07)
0.18***
(0.04)
0.23
(0.18)
-0.06
(0.13)
-0.00
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.02)
0.50***
(0.15)
0.03
(0.06)
-0.09
(0.18)
0.47***
(0.11)
0.61***
(0.13)
0.54**
(0.26)
-13.66***
(4.71)
-0.11
(0.08)
-0.07
(0.12)
0.05
(0.24)
-0.75***
(0.07)
-0.26***
(0.09)
0.03
(0.06)
-0.04
(0.06)

-0.21**
(0.10)
0.77***
(0.06)
-0.13
(0.08)
0.18**
(0.09)
0.36
(0.24)
-0.21
(0.17)
-0.06***
(0.02)

-0.17
(0.10)
0.74***
(0.06)
-0.13
(0.08)
0.19***
(0.07)
0.82***
(0.28)
-0.19
(0.17)
-0.04**
(0.02)
0.05
(0.04)
0.38*
(0.23)
0.10
(0.10)
0.25
(0.20)
0.39*
(0.22)
0.27
(0.20)
0.01
(0.39)
-11.20
(6.90)
-0.26*
(0.15)
-0.34*
(0.20)
0.15
(0.35)

-0.09
(0.09)
0.75***
(0.06)
-0.29***
(0.09)
0.11*
(0.06)
0.78***
(0.27)
-0.20
(0.17)
-0.03
(0.02)
0.04
(0.04)
0.20
(0.23)
0.10
(0.10)
0.21
(0.20)
0.36*
(0.21)
0.19
(0.20)
0.25
(0.36)
-5.11
(7.06)
-0.21
(0.16)
-0.35*
(0.19)
0.20
(0.35)
-0.32***
(0.09)
-0.27**
(0.12)
-0.07
(0.09)
-0.15**
(0.08)

District Fixed Effects?

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

R2

0.69

0.71

0.73

0.70

0.73

0.74

N=

3006

2856

2856

976

926

926

Number of men (10,000s) per tribe
log(total population)
Population density
Number of male school age children (1,000s)
Number of villages in subdistrict (100s)
Ruggedness (VRM) of subdistrict
log(distance of subdistrict centroid from district capital)
log(total area owned by villagers in sub-district)
Share of Land Cultivable
Share of Cultivable Land that is Rainfed
Share of Cultivable Land that is Fed from Wells
Share of households owning plots less than 5,000 square meters
Share of households owning plots 5,000-20,000 square meters

Number of goats & sheep per household (100s)
Number of cows per household (100s)
Share of land cultivated with grains
Share of land cultivated with qat
Share of land cultivated with cash crops
Share of Households using Wood, Coal or Kerosense for Cooking

Share of Households without Sanitation
Share of Households without Piped Water
Share of Households without Electricity

0.06
(0.11)
0.07*
(0.04)
-0.00
(0.11)
0.01
(0.06)
-0.25
(0.16)
0.23*
(0.12)
0.03
(0.02)
Yes
0.22
977

-0.21**
(0.10)
0.79***
(0.06)
-0.29*
(0.17)
0.18**
(0.09)
0.30
(0.24)
-0.19
(0.17)
-0.06***
(0.02)
Yes
0.71
977

District Fixed Effects?

R2

N=

977

0.39

Yes

(0.04)

-0.03

(0.29)

0.38

(0.57)

0.75

(0.15)

0.45***

(0.36)

-0.23

(0.10)

0.42***

977

0.19

Yes

(0.01)

-0.00

(0.13)

-0.10

(0.17)

0.18

(0.07)

0.05

(0.22)

0.62***

(0.04)

0.01

(0.10)

-0.14

Local
Donor

(4)

977

0.34

Yes

(0.03)

-0.11***

(0.24)

0.36

(0.45)

0.18

(0.12)

0.23*

(0.29)

-0.59**

(0.08)

0.33***

(0.21)

0.19

Local
Council

(5)

977

0.48

Yes

(0.04)

-0.08**

(0.33)

-0.36

(0.46)

-0.00

(0.13)

0.20

(0.36)

-0.24

(0.11)

0.84***

(0.16)

-0.27

Government
Ministry

(6)

977

0.21

Yes

(0.04)

0.00

(0.35)

-0.13

(0.46)

-0.02

(0.12)

0.45***

(0.40)

-0.78*

(0.10)

0.40***

(0.24)

-0.38

SFD

(7)

(8)

977

0.56

Yes

(0.03)

-0.08***

(0.27)

-0.21

(0.46)

0.09

(0.13)

0.42***

(0.32)

-0.31

(0.09)

0.63***

(0.17)

-0.08

Community

Note: “Local Donor” includes mosques, Yemeni corporations, and Yemeni private individuals. “Local Council” are the local
councils that were elected during the 2004 local elections. “SFD” is the Social Fund for Development.

log(distance of subdistrict centroid from district capital)

Ruggedness (VRM) of subdistrict

Number of villages in subdistrict (100s)

Number of male school age children (1,000s)

Population density

log(number of men)

(0.20)

-0.54***

Western
Donors

Arab
Donors

All

Number of men (10,000s) per tribe

(3)

(2)

(1)

Dependent Variable: log(number of classrooms in subdistrict) [by donor]

Table 5: Classroom Construction by Donor

Table 6: Tribe Size and the Number of Classrooms Built by Western Donors

Dependent Variable: log(number of classrooms built by Western Donors)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.40**
(0.19)
0.63***
(0.06)

-0.39*
(0.21)
0.70***
(0.07)

-0.54***
(0.20)
0.42***
(0.10)
-0.23
(0.36)
0.45***
(0.15)
0.75
(0.57)
0.38
(0.29)
-0.03
(0.04)

-0.60***
(0.21)
0.37***
(0.10)
0.03
(0.39)
0.60***
(0.12)
0.97
(0.79)
0.29
(0.30)
-0.01
(0.04)
0.02
(0.05)
-0.03
(0.33)
-0.05
(0.17)
0.86**
(0.38)
-0.27
(0.32)
-0.38
(0.37)
1.14*
(0.62)
-14.34
(9.85)
-0.10
(0.21)
-0.52
(0.34)
-0.33
(0.68)

-0.57***
(0.21)
0.38***
(0.10)
-0.13
(0.41)
0.56***
(0.12)
1.01
(0.79)
0.27
(0.30)
-0.00
(0.04)
0.01
(0.05)
-0.16
(0.34)
-0.05
(0.17)
0.83**
(0.37)
-0.30
(0.32)
-0.42
(0.37)
1.24**
(0.62)
-11.14
(9.84)
-0.07
(0.22)
-0.49
(0.34)
-0.31
(0.68)
-0.14
(0.16)
-0.42*
(0.23)
-0.06
(0.17)
0.05
(0.15)

District Fixed Effects?

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

R2

0.15

0.37

0.39

0.40

0.40

N=

1000

1000

977

927

927

Number of men (10,000s) per tribe
log(total population)
Population density
Number of male school age children (1,000s)
Number of villages in subdistrict (100s)
Ruggedness (VRM) of subdistrict
log(distance of subdistrict centroid from district capital)
log(total area owned by villagers in sub-district)
Share of Land Cultivable
Share of Cultivable Land that is Rainfed
Share of Cultivable Land that is Fed from Wells
Share of households owning plots less than 5,000 square meters
Share of households owning plots 5,000-20,000 square meters

Number of goats & sheep per household (100s)
Number of cows per household (100s)
Share of land cultivated with grains
Share of land cultivated with qat
Share of land cultivated with cash crops
Share of Households using Wood, Coal or Kerosense for Cooking

Share of Households without Sanitation
Share of Households without Piped Water
Share of Households without Electricity

